IV. BEYOND JI: A CHECKLIST
JI has never been the only organisation in Indonesia influenced by the ideology of salafi jihadism. Others include:
? Noordins group, which he has variously called Anshar el-Muslimin, Thoifah Muqotilah, and al-Qaeda for the Malay archipelago (Tandzim Qoedatul-Jihad Untuk Gugusan Kepulauan Melayu). It is the only group in Indonesia at present which self-consciously follows the al-Qaeda line. The Bali bombers, Aly Ghufron alias Mukhlas and Imam Samudra, continue to exert an influence through their writings, and it probably retains some sympathy in more militant JI circles. But we are likely talking about a handful of people, and if Noordin attempted no attack in 2006, it may be that he is being protected by JI at the price of no bombings. That said, the exact nature of the relationship JI leaders like Nuaim and Abu Dujama have with Noordin is not clear, and there may be other factors at play.
? Ring Banten, the Darul Islam splinter based in West Java that worked with Noordin on the Australian Embassy bombing. Kang Jaja, the groups leader, is known to have been protected by Hasanuddin, head of the Poso wakalah, in 2004; he now may be back in Java. Family, business and regional loyalties among members help keep the group intact, and there is almost certainly regular communication with JI. (One Ring Banten member, now detained, started a group in Kemayoran, Jakarta that continues to meet and seems to bring together a few dozen alumni of the JI school, Darusy-Syahada.)
? Mujahidin KOMPAK, the loose network of KOMPAK-funded veterans of the Ambon and Poso conflicts. The group has no organisational structure but a few text messages or mobile phone calls can quickly bring a dozen or so men together. Its affiliate in Poso, Mujahidin Kayamanya, is apparently trying to rebuild after being decimated by arrests. It is virulently anti-Christian, particularly interested in exploiting local communal conflict and continues to have at least a handful of members in Mindanao.
? Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad, based in Bandung. It was founded by Aman Abdurahman alias Abu Sulaiman, a salafi imam arrested in March 2004 for leading a bomb-making class in Cimanggis (Depok), outside Jakarta. At the time few had heard of him but his excellent Arabic language skills put him in demand as a translator of jihadist tracts by the Jordanian al-Maqdisi and Egyptians Aiman Zawaheri, Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz and others. These are now being published by JI-linked publishers in Solo and Jakarta. His group was originally called al-Muwahidun and seemed to have some links to Darul Islam and Ring Banten through an Ambon and Poso veteran, Nazaruddin Muchtar alias Harun, arrested for involvement in the May 2005 attack on police in Loki, West Ceram, Maluku. The name change may have been around 2005. Website material overlaps that on Noordin-linked sites and focuses heavily on thoghut governments as the main enemy of Islam.
? Small cells with no organizational affiliation. A November 2006 bombing in Jakarta at an A&W fast food restaurant is often overlooked, as it caused no serious damage and injured only the bomber, Muhammed Nuh, now on trial in Jakarta. But it is significant precisely because Nuh appears to have become committed to suicide bombing from his readings and Internet browsing. Manuals with step-by-step instruction on how to form jihad cells have been circulating for two years. One, Serial Jihad IV, referred to above, may be a translation from an article in Sawt al-Jihad, the on-line al-Qaeda magazine. A second, Sel Tauhid (Tauhid Cell) is translated from Arabic, and its author appears to be Syrian. It reflects the basic thinking of the Spanish-Syrian jihadi intellectual, Abu Musab al-Suri, that a war against the U.S. and its allies is best conducted by autonomous cells working toward the same goal.
The importance of these groups is that they may be able to attract experienced jihadis unhappy with the JI mainstream, thereby adding depth and professionalism to what otherwise would be fairly amateur efforts. If Subur Sugiarto could bring one JI cell over to Noordin in early 2005 and form two others by August 2005 in the lead-up to Bali II, it suggests recruitment is not that difficult.
V. CONCLUSION
We will have to wait for more arrests and more information from those detained in March for definitive answers to questions about JIs current status. It is resilient but not invulnerable, and while it continues to recruit, the organisation as a whole may be shrinking. People have left for different reasons. In some cases, like Subur Sugiartos, it may be because a more militant wing finds JI too cautious and bureaucratic. Others, particularly released prisoners, may be co-opted, if only temporarily, by government officials hoping to infiltrate and divide the organisation. One alumnus of a JI pesantren said that he realised he had graduated with no useful skills, and the only occupation open to him, outside petty trade, was teaching in another JI school. If schools are critical to JIs regeneration, then dissatisfaction with restrictions inside and opportunities outside may ultimately do more damage to the group than arrests.
The Indonesian police get high marks for their work in identifying and tracking down criminals. Now the government needs to pay much more attention to prisons: what goes on inside, communications with the outside, visitors and the materials they bring in. More attention to pre- and post-release programs is required. The creation of a super-maximum security prison is not the answer to halting terrorism as long as many prison officials are corruptible or simply inadequately informed about their inmates. Indeed, if all prisoners accused of terrorism are locked up together, under current circumstances many are likely to emerge more radical than when they went in. It is not only because prisons are poorly managed; it is also because many people charged under the terrorism law are not hardcore ideologues but young men who could benefit from a structured rehabilitation and work-release program. The last thing Indonesia needs is for these men to be exposed in prison to the likes of the Bali I bombers.
JI reaches from one end of the Indonesian archipelago to the other and has a proven capacity to adapt and regenerate. There is nothing to suggest that it is growing but its roots run deep. JI and its various splinters and mutations will continue to be a security threat for the forseeable future.
Jakarta/Brussels, 3 May 2007
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