Melo Commission Report: Conclusion

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It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

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Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.[112]

Even assuming that these victims and these �enemies of the state� are indeed guilty of crimes against the nation, they have not been convicted of the said offenses. If some military elements indeed had reason to believe that these persons were NPA agents or operatives, then they could have simply instituted the proper criminal actions against them and had them arrested. By declaring persons enemies of the state, and in effect, adjudging them guilty of crimes, these persons have arrogated unto themselves the power of the courts and of the executive branch of government. It is as if their judgment is: These people, as enemies of the state, deserve to be slain on sight. This, they cannot do. Such an abuse of power strikes at the very heart of freedom and democracy, which are, ironically, the very bylines and principles these rogue elements invoke in seeking the �neutralization� of these so-called enemies of state.

This Commission is not ignorant or unmindful of the crimes committed by insurgents, nor of the benefits of having a decent military to defend our freedom and way of life. To be sure, those slain by rebels and insurgents far outnumber the killings attributed by the leftist to the government. Many of our sons, husbands, and fathers have been slain or injured in encounters with the NPA, or have been assassinated by dreaded hitmen or mowed down in ambuscades and other acts of terrorism of the CPP-NPA. Understandable, justified, and commendable, in fact, is the fervor with which the State, through the military, feels the need to avenge these heroes who perished in the defense of the country. However, this should not be at the cost of the freedom we are protecting in the first place.

The military and police authorities are laudable and necessary institutions, whose smooth operation according to the Constitution is absolutely essential to the country�s security. The military should not be allowed to descend to the level of the insurgents and rebels themselves with their lawless, treacherous methodologies. It is in this light that the whip must be cracked to bring the rogue military elements back in line.

The words of the Supreme Court in Aberca v. Ver[113] are apropos:

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.